## 1NC

### Off

**[ASPEC]**

**Third, absent specifying, these debates will always lead to a permutation obviating the research ground for comparative institutional analysis**

**Komesar 94** (Neil Komesar, professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, “Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy,” p 41-2)

Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high sounding announcements of right. The welfare of the populace depends on the presence of institutions capable of translating high sounding principles into substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have had difficulties with representation and participation are important for resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem even more important in fronting the more complicated standard that Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task of this integration seems central here. The real content of Rawlsian justice depends on such determination. Any theory of justice capable of even minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of the institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essential-perhaps the essential-component in the realization of the just society. The more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more central becomes the issue of who decides-the issue of institutional choice. The discussion of boomer showed that these questions of institutional choice dominate issues of resource allocation efficiency-a definition of the social good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good such as Rawl’s theory of justice. The lessons about the important and complexity of institutional choice derived from Boomer are even more appropriate with more-complex definitions of the good.

**Comparative institutional analysis is the most fundamental question for academics working for social change. Failure to guarantee this ground guarantees organizational failures and prevents critical questioning of ethical responsibility**

**Heminway, 05** (Joan, professor of law at the University of Tennessee, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, lexis)

This article offers a model for comparative institutional choice specifically for use in the context of federal corporate governance reforms. It also, however, constitutes part of the larger academic movement advocating comparative institutional analysis. Comparative institutional analysis is **critically important** to the work of scholars and other proponents of law reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules without also suggesting the vehicle for the suggested reforms. The determination of the appropriate rulemaking body should be accomplished by employing some rigorous form of comparative institutional analysis. In this regard, the framework included in this article is intended to endorse in full the views of Professor Neil Komesar when he says: [\*384] ¶ Unless we do better with the difficult issues of institutional choice, any reforms, changes and proposals will remain **illusory or cosmetic**. We will continue to cycle through the same proposals with the same arguments. Today's policy will always have feet of clay and be replaced by yesterday's rejected panacea, which somehow reappears (without blemishes) as tomorrow's solution. Attempts to fashion proposals and programs cannot stop until we fully understand institutional choice. That understanding will be long in coming and is more likely to occur if judges, lawyers and law reformers seriously struggle with the subject **as they make** their decisions and proposals. It is that struggle that I hope for. I want those who make or seek to change law to seriously confront and address institutional choice and comparison. I recognize that, to do so, they will often have to rely on intuition and guesses. It is the **responsibility** of legal academics to provide deeper understanding of these central issues and, therefore, to improve the ability of those who struggle with these decisions. [581](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=aa91df1416a18d87537d72b0e3763e33&docnum=20&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=01ed68c7086eb1b7d8508b691f80e0b7&focBudTerms=imperfect%20alternatives%20and%20komesar%20and%20legislative%20or%20legislature%20or%20executive%20w/20%20judicial%20or%20judiciary%20and%20comparative%20institutional%20analysis&focBudSel=all#n581)

### Off

We’ll begin with a story fromMeinzerin, Kuhn, and Klausmann in 1997

(Marion Meinzerin, professor of history at Cambridge University, Gabriel Kuhn, Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Innsbruck, Ulrike Klausman, freelance journalist, “Woman Pirates and the politics of the Jolly Roger”, Pg 18-22, *azp*)

**Medusa is the Gorgon’s head threatening to emerge from the sea. This terrible monster was once a beautiful woman who was raped in a temple of Athena by the sea god Poseidon.** According to Ovid, **Athena was so enraged that she turned Medusa into an ugly creature, transforming her hair into a thousand snakes**. After that **Medusa was so ugly that any man who caught sight of her would turn to stone**. Very much in keeping with modern»day court procedures in cases of rape, **Athena let the rapist go unpunished**. Why was **Athena** so hostile to women? Actually she **was a very ancient wise goddess, of far older origin than the male Hellenic gods.** But **after the arrival of male gods to the mythology, she was transformed into a being birthed from Zeus’s** head, who had swallowed her mother Metis, the Goddess of Wisdom, who was pregnant with Athena by parthenogenesis. Afterwards, **Athena became the protective goddess of many a hero. One of them was Perseus the Destroyer. He was sent to kill Medusa. Athena gave him a perfectly reﬂective bronze shield, so that he could see Medusa without looking at her**. Thanks to this device, **Perseus was able to behead Medusa, with Athena guiding his hand. He stuck Medusa’s head in a sack and gave it as a gift to Athena, who thereafter carried the snakes on her breastplate so as to strike fear into her enemies**. The symbol of the snake always belonged to Athena, whose mother Metis was called “the wise counsel.” In prehistoric times the snake was a symbol of feminine wisdom, and not just of growth and fertility, as was later assumed. Metis and Medusa represent one and the same power. The name Medusa, a feminine form of medon (ruler), derives from the Sanskrit root medha (wisdom), which is also the root for the Greek metis (good counsel). **The grimace of the grey-skinned snake’s head expresses the fury of those women who still remember**. The Latin word for causing someone to think of something, to remind or to warn, is monere. Etymologically a “monster” is thus the “emblem of the gods in terrifying manifestation.” The monster Medusa reﬂects countless obsessive ideas about sea monsters. In mythological terms, **the Medusa story relates the destruction of female culture**; in psychoanalytic terms it describes the hero’s murder of his mother, and femininity as a psycho-symbolic monstrosity? In the end **Perseus failed to achieve his goal, despite divine** protection and all manner of magical assistance, and although he killed his enemy in her sleep with his hand guided by Athena. **Medusa lives on, the Gorgon’s head has grown back, and its fury has by no means burnt out**. The terror of men before Gorgo, who pulls ships into the depths by their bowsprit in the midst of a tempest, is fully justiﬁed. **Gorgo is the Greek name not only for Medusa—petriﬁed through “ugliness”—but also for the mermaids, who are known to be beautiful and lovely. This may seem like a paradox, but corresponds to the ambivalence with which men view the female**. Aristotle’s hostility to women is far more consistent, and serves to clarify the connection. The relationship between femininity, ﬁsh, mermaids, and sea monsters lies in the attributes “wet” and “cold.” These beings all have a shortage of “heat,” and are thus also lacking in soul and reason. According to Aristotle, a mother only provides the passive material, while the father contributes the active soul endowed with reason. He bears the true species of humans (man). If a mother nonetheless brings a female being to the world, she has circumvented the reasoning species, and once again set loose upon the world a monster lacking in soul. In the legends of seafarers, mermaids also have no souls—but might be able to occasionally acquire one by adopting a respectable way of life among people, and falling in love with a man. Patriarchal **stories of dragon-slaying show two different images of the female: the powerful, threatening mother in the form of the monster, and the desirable, submissive virgin**. In the killing of the dragon, psychoanalysts like C.G. lung and Erich Neumann saw the liberation of **the man from his terrible mother, and the conquest of a new image of the female in the form of the lovely virgin. The man becomes a hero by freeing the virgin from the claws of the mighty monster, in order to subordinate her to himself**. In his book on the origins of consciousness, Erich Neumann writes: “the transformation of the male that occurs in the course of battling the dragon includes a change in his relationship to the female, symbolised in the liberation of the hostage from the power of the dragon; meaning a dissolution of the image of the female from that of the terrible mother.“ Neumann ignores that in antiquity, the life-giving femininity of the Earth and the cosmos was worshipped in the form of the Great Mother. In all her monstrosity she threatens the male need for recognition. That which psychologists understand as the liberation of man from the overwhelming power of mother is actually a desire in the collective male consciousness to subdue nature itself. **The story of** our hero **Perseus goes on to show how pointless these acts of violence actually are. Flying high on the trip home after his “glorious” beheading of Medusa, Perseus encounters a beautiful, naked virgin chained to a cliff. On the horizon a sea monster approaches**. The unhappy girl is the daughter of an Ethiopian queen, who had boasted that she and her daughter were as beautiful as the Nereids. The Nereids promptly lodged a complaint with Poseidon, who sent out a ﬂood of storms and a female sea monster in retribution. An oracle declared that the queen’s daughter had to be chained to the cliffs. **Perseus, a man of action, did not dilly-dally**. After quickly negotiating the dowry with the parents of the princess, **he killed the monster in a bloody battle, and “as prize and cause of all the trouble the virgin strides up, released from her chains**,” according to Ovid. Here **Perseus seems to have won the battle of his life, acquiring a kingdom and a lovely princess.** But closer observation shows that the action has gone subtly awry. **The lovely and passive princess is called Andromeda**: andro-mcda, meaning **the “ruler of men.” The information that her mother is an Ethiopian suggests a likely relationship to the Libyan Medusa**. **Apparently the beautiful virgin and her monstrous mother relate one and the same femininity**. Leviathan poses the biblical counterpart to the Greek myth of Medusa. He is a sea serpent, appearing in the legends of sea travellers as the worst of all sea monsters, crushing ships and swallowing seafarers.

The affirmative’s view of the subject under capital is that of Perseus’s perception of women – the Other is dangerous yet alluring – something to be mapped yet radically unknowable – something to be defeated yet something to be won – a roll of the ballot calling for the liberation of the oppressed is symptomatic of the masculine heroism Perseus is engrained in – the ballot becomes a symbol of the prize of Otherness while ontologically erasing the subaltern – the affirmative’s distancing of themselves from those they invoke is like Perseus’s shield – they view the subaltern through a kaleidoscopic lens while sitting comfortably in this air conditioned simulacra we call the debate round – this knowledge production is not just useless neutrality but rather the lynchpin of the Western intellectual subject – any argument the affirmative makes about how the subaltern would totally be on-board with their project relies on the same logic that reinforces conceptions of the inferior Other – their forcus on voice in the first contention is ironic because a ballot for the affirmative rips out the subaltern’s vocal chords

Spivak 88 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* 1988“Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, *azp*)

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientiﬁc production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the ﬁnal determinant or the transcendental signiﬁed. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redeﬁnition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redeﬁnition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualiﬁed as inadequate to their task or insufﬁ- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientiﬁcity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .

Isn’t it off-putting that the affirmative merely expresses solidarity with the oppressed yet does little to nothing to actually relieve their oppression? – What do you think their endless theories, intellectual movements, and speech acts actually DO to resolve anything? – the answer is absolutely nothing – they aren’t subversive, nor radical, nor even that interesting – their speech act is an intellectual façade designed to avoid having to resolve oppression

Raskin 99 (Marcus Raskin, Professor of Public Policy at George Washington University, 1999, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

As I have noted, world social categories and knowledge systems have changed so that they now see the colonized as human beings. The shifting in social categories, often by those who are the radicals and liberals of the privileged groups, created deep divisions between reality and its description. But this has not necessarily resulted in fundamental affirmative change. For those who were consigned to the role of slave, serf and oppressed by imperial Western nations, it may be disconcerting, but pleasantly surprising, that some leading international lawyers and intellectuals stand with those movements that take their strength from the dispossessed, wretched and exploited, whether in war or peace. Even though these idealists are educated in Western and imperial categories of social reality, they have, nonetheless, taken as their task the reconstruction and transformation of international law as it is understood in the United States. The skeptical are permitted their doubts, however. After all, what can those who represent the pain of others, and only indirectly their own, do to ameliorate the pain of misery sanctioned by imperial law? **What do such a band of idealists dare to teach to those who suffer, especially when that suffering is often caused, directly or indirectly, by the choices made by the very class of which these Western intellectuals and lawyers are members?** Why should the oppressed listen to those educated in a language and thought-pattern which, beneath the honeyed words, are the egocentric and ethnocentric doctrines of the [\*524] dominator? Certainly until decolonization, the abstract meaning of the words were employed as signifiers and killers of the culturally oppressed. The language of description and the mode of argument, the very words themselves, were instruments of the colonizer. Their very rules, laws, precedents and citations acted as a steel-belted noose to stifle the cries of the wretched. And yet, these were the very lessons the colonized needed to learn in order to stand up to the colonizer and survive. Not only did they survive, they pressed on to reform nineteenth and early twentieth century imperial law using the UN, and the International Court of Justice. Most importantly, they effected the consciousness of nations. Nevertheless, the wretched must wonder why, behind claims of universality and universal human rights, our actions and thoughts have an often indeterminate or contradictory effect. For Americans, the reason is a complex one. Americans seek identification with the victim in their dreams, but the reality for the American political and legal class is somewhere between carelessness and negligence of the oppressed worker, toleration for the destruction of other people's cultures for purposes of extraction and commodification, exploiter of their lands, and executioner in counter-revolutions which rain bombs of state and financial terror around the world. So even when some in the United States stand with the victim, they must always wonder, "Who are we that come forward with our notions that speak of human affirmation? Who are we to tell the colonized when independence is a drag on themselves and on others as well, possibly leading to war and internecine conflict?" And the wretched can go further and say, "You have recognized our struggle, taken away our language and substituted your words of understanding, but **now what?** How is freedom to be sustained? We, the formerly marginalized, the indigenous and the merely wretched, have come to recognize that what is presented by the West to humanity as conventional knowledge is a betrayal." In truth, **it was a betrayal by intellectuals and all those who dared to suggest that the twentieth century could be a time of liberation and freedom**. **Education and knowledge as mediated through the colonizer's strainer has left humanity in worse shape than at the beginning of the twentieth century**. For some, the god that really failed them was education/knowledge, which, through its institutions, set itself up as the emancipator. This failure, this sense of futility where knowledge is an instrument of domination for the few, demands recognition.

The affirmative’s narrative structure perpetuates a politics of forced presencing that extends the disciplinary logic of the system to the confessional while depoliticizing their speech act, ensuring that dominant relations go unaltered

Brown 96 (Wendy Brown \* Wendy Brown is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable 1996)

But if the silences in discourses of domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, if they are the corridors we must fill with explosive counter-tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of breaking silence. Even more than a fetish, it is possible that this ostensible tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation--that it converges with non-emancipatory tendencies in contem- porary culture (for example, the ubiquity of confessional discourse and rampant personalization of political life), that it establishes regulatory norms, coincides with the disciplinary power of confession, in short, feeds the powers we meant to starve. While attempting to avoid a simple reversal of feminist valorizations of breaking silence, it is this dimension of silence and its putative opposite with which this Article is concerned. In the course of this work, I want to make the case for silence not simply as an aesthetic but a political value, a means of preserving certain practices and dimensions of existence from regulatory power, from normative violence, as well as from the scorching rays of public exposure. I also want to suggest a link between, on the one hand, a certain contemporary tendency concerning the lives of public figures--the confession or extraction of every detail of private and personal life (sexual, familial, therapeutic, financial) and, on the other, a certain practice in feminist culture: the compulsive putting into public discourse of heretofore hidden or private experiences--from catalogues of sexual pleasures to litanies of sexual abuses, from chronicles of eating disorders to diaries of homebirths, lesbian mothering, and Gloria Steinam's inner revolution. In linking these two phenomena--the privatization of public life via the mechanism of public exposure of private life on the one hand, and the compulsive/compulsory cataloguing of the details rof women's lives on the other--I want to highlight a modality of regulation and depoliticization specific to our age that is not simply confessional but empties private life into the public domain, and thereby also usurps public space with the relatively trivial, rendering the political personal in a fashion that leaves injurious social, political and economic powers unremarked and untouched. In short, while intended as a practice of freedom (premised on the modernist conceit that the truth shall make us free), these productions of truth not only bear the capacity to chain us to our injurious histories as well as the stations of our small lives but also to instigate the further regulation of those lives, all the while depoliticizing their conditions.

The 1AC is a form of vampirism which allows privileged institutions and individuals to enhance their social position at the expense of those without privilege. The AFF is merely a market exchange in the political economy of debate which covers over the contradictions of commodification.

Leong 2012

/Nancy, Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, “Racial Capitalism,” Harvard Law Review, <http://www.utexas.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2012-2013/09-20-12_Leong%20--%20Racial%20Capitalism.pdf/>

The exchange mechanism Lin posits, in conjunction with Podolny’s account of status-seeking behavior by market participants, reveals the way that the value associated with non-whiteness is transferred. As a result of the legal and social preoccupation with diversity arising from affirmative action doctrine, white people and predominantly white institutions may elevate their status within various markets by affiliating themselves with non-white individuals. We might, for instance, conceive of a status market in “non-racism.” Within this specific market, white individuals and predominantly white institutions tend to have relatively low status. When a white individual or a predominantly white institution engages in an exchange with a non-white person within such a market, we see, in Podolny’s terms, a status leak. The non-white party loses some amount of status, and the white party absorbs some of the status that the non-white party has lost. Put more concretely, the white individual or predominantly white institution has increased status within the “non-racism” market by demonstrating the ability to engage in a relationship with a non-white individual. Meanwhile, the non-white person’s status has diminished within that same market through affiliation with a white individual or a predominantly white institution. Although such exchanges are not fully theorized in the scholarly literature, we do see limited recognition this sort of racial status exchange: Randall Kennedy, for instance, has chronicled the status diminution of non-white people, particularly those in “elite, predominantly white settings,” when other non-whites perceive that they have “sold out” to the expectations of white society.123

The ballot is also a form of self-subalternization, where the judges are encouraged to found a vacuous solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing the material deprivation portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust

Chow 93 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

**The AFF’s demand for action is a way of covering over the ways in which forms of oppression work in the present. We cannot transcend that oppression through speech – the role of the intellectual should be to intervene into the political economy of commodification and expose how systems of oppression are functioning in the here and now. The AFF’s desire for transcendence gives the illusion of progress while being an interpassive form which prevents proper analysis.**

**Ahmed, 4**

/Sarah, Reader in Race and Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths College, University of London. Her writings include: Differences that Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism (1998); Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality (2000) and The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004). She is currently working on two books: Orientations: Towards a Queer Phenomenology and Doing Diversity: Racism and Educated Subjects. The latter book will draw on data collected from the research project Integrating Diversity? Gender, Race and Leadership in the Post 16 Skills Sector, which is housed in Women's Studies, Lancaster University and the Centre of Excellence for Leadership (CEL), and is funded by the DfES. The project, which she co-directs with Elaine Swan, asks the question 'what does diversity do' within the context of adult and community learning, further education and higher education in the UK, and includes comparative analyses of the 'turns' to diversity within Australia and Canada., “Declarations of Whiteness: The Non-Performativity of Anti-Racism,” *Borderlands* 3:2, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no2_2004/ahmed_declarations.htm/>

These statements function as claims to performativity rather than as performatives, whereby the declaration of whiteness is assumed to put in place the conditions in which racism can be transcended, or at the very least reduced in its power. Any presumption that such statements are forms of political action would be an overestimation of the power of saying, and even a performance of the very privilege that such statements claim they undo. The declarative mode, as a way of doing something, involves a fantasy of transcendence in which ‘what’ is transcended is the very thing ‘admitted to’ in the declaration: so, to put it simply, if we admit to being bad, then we show that we are good (see also paper by Hill and Riggs in this issue). So it is in this specific sense that I have argued that anti-racism is not performative. Or we could even say that anti-racist speech in a racist world is an ‘unhappy performative’: the conditions are not in place that would allow such ‘saying’ to ‘do’ what it ‘says’.¶ 55. Our task is not to repeat anti-racist speech in the hope that it will acquire performativity. Nor should we be satisfied with the ‘terms’ of racism, or hope they will acquire new meanings, or even look for new terms. Instead, anti-racism requires much harder work, as it requires working with racism as an ongoing reality in the present. Anti-racism requires interventions in the political economy of race, and how racism distributes resources and capacities unequally amongst others. Those unequal distributions also affect the ‘business’ of speech, and who gets to say what, about whom, and where. We need to consider the intimacy between privilege and the work we do, even in the work we do on privilege. 56. You might not be surprised to hear that a white response to this paper has asked the question, ‘but what are white people to do’. That question is not necessarily misguided, although it does re-center on white agency, as a hope premised on lack rather than presence. It is a question asked persistently in response to hearing about racism and colonialism: I always remember being in an audience to a paper on the stolen generation and the first question asked was: ‘but what can we do’. The impulse towards action is understandable and complicated; it can be both a defense against the ‘shock’ of hearing about racism (and the shock of the complicity revealed by the very ‘shock’ that ‘this’ was a ‘shock’); it can be an impulse to reconciliation as a ‘re-covering’ of the past (the desire to feel better); it can be about making public one’s judgment (‘what happened was wrong’); or it can be an expression of solidarity (‘I am with you’); or it can simply an orientation towards the openness of the future (rephrased as: ‘what can be done?’). But the question, in all of these modes of utterance, can work to block hearing; in moving on from the present towards the future, it can also move away from the object of critique, or place the white subject ‘outside’ that critique in the present of the hearing. In other words, the desire to act, to move, or even to move on, can stop the message ‘getting through’. 57. To hear the work of exposure requires that white subjects inhabit the critique, with its lengthy duration, and to recognise the world that is re-described by the critique as one in which they live. The desire to act in a non-racist or anti-racist way when one hears about racism, in my view, can function as a defense against hearing how that racism implicates which subjects, in the sense that it shapes the spaces inhabited by white subjects in the unfinished present. Such a question can even allow the white subject to re-emerge as an agent in the face of the exposure of racism, by saying ‘I am not that’ (the racists of whom you speak), as an expression of ‘good faith’. The desire for action, or even the desire to be seen as the good white anti-racist subject, is not always a form of bad faith, that is, it does not necessarily involve the concealment of racism. But such a question rushes too quickly past the exposure of racism and hence ‘risks’ such concealment in the very ‘return’ of its address.¶ 58. I am of course risking being seen as producing a ‘useless’ critique by not prescribing what an anti-racist whiteness studies would be, or by not offering some suggestions about ‘what white people can do’. I am happy to take that risk. At the same time, I think it is quite clear that my critique of ‘anti-racist whiteness’ is prescriptive. After all, I am arguing that whiteness studies, even in its critical form, should not be about re-describing the white subject as anti-racist, or constitute itself as a form of anti-racism, or even as providing the conditions for anti-racism. Whiteness studies should instead be about attending to forms of white racism and white privilege that are not undone, and may even be repeated and intensified, through declarations of whiteness, or through the recognition of privilege as privilege. 59. In making this prescription, it is important that I do not rush to ‘inhabit’ a ‘beyond’ to the work of exposing racism, as that which structures the present that we differently inhabit. At the same time, it is always tempting to end one’s work with an expression of political hope. Such hope is what makes the work of critique possible, in the sense that without hope, the future would be decided, and there would be nothing left to do. Perhaps its time to ‘return’ to the ‘turn’ of whiteness studies, by asking where else we might turn. If ‘whiteness studies’ turns towards white privilege, as that which enables and endures declarations of whiteness, then this does not simply involve turning towards the white subject, which would amount to the narcissism of a perpetual return. Rather, whiteness studies should involve at least a double turn: to turn towards whiteness is to turn towards and away from those bodies who have been afforded agency and mobility by such privilege. In other words, the task for white subjects would be to stay implicated in what they critique, but in turning towards their role and responsibility in these histories of racism, as histories of this present, to turn away from themselves, and towards others. This ‘double turn’ is not sufficient, but it clears some ground, upon which the work of exposing racism might provide the conditions for another kind of work. We don’t know, as yet, what such conditions might be, or whether we are even up to the task of recognizing them.

### Off

[Inherency]

b) Neoliberalism is at an all-time low in Latin America

Pineo, 13 – Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Towson University (Ron, Posted on April 11, 2013 - See more at: http://www.coha.org/22227/#sthash.L5CsywQs.dpuf

Poverty in Latin America has been reduced substantially in the last three decades. In the late 1980s, nearly half of Latin America’s population lived in poverty. Today the fraction is about a third. [21] This marks important progress, and it has continued in some area nations. However, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2008, poverty contracted most in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina, countries which had largely **abandoned neoliberalism**; in Brazil, which had at least partially rejected neoliberalism; and in only two other states, Honduras and Perú, which still remained, at least partially, committed to free market polices. [22] It was mostly factors **beyond economic policy** that helps to account for recent declines in the rate of Latin American poverty. One factor was increasing remittances from Latin Americans laboring in the developed world, especially in the United States. Total remittances from Latin American workers rose from $12 billion USD in 1995, to $45 billion in 2004, and $68 billion in 2006. [23] However, “by far the main contributor to the reduction in the poverty rate,” as Jaime Ros has noted, was “the fall in the dependency ratio.” [24] The indicator measures the number of non-working age people—children and the elderly—who are supported by the working age population. The higher the dependency number, the greater the economic burden. Source: foreignpolicyblogs.com Latin America’s past demographic history underlies this shift in the dependency ratio. The late 1940s in Latin America witnessed lower overall death rates (the number of people who died a year divided by the total population), especially due to lower infant and childhood mortality rates. Initially, birth rates stayed high even as death rates fell, but after a generation passed Latin America’s birth rates began to drift downward to match the lower death rates. The time gap between the fall in death rates beginning in the late 1940s and the eventual fall in birth rates by the late 1970s resulted in an unprecedented population explosion. Latin America’s population rose from 167 million in 1950 to 285 million by 1970. As this population cohort has aged, Latin America’s dependency ratio fell too, dropping from a very high rate of 87.3 in the years 1965-1970, to 55.0 for 2005-2010, an all-time low for the region. The people born during the population explosion are of working age now, bringing the region a historic but one-time economic advantage, the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend.” As a result, Latin America temporarily enjoys a situation of a very large number of workers providing for a greatly reduced number of dependent people. The region’s demographic bonus means that there is, for the moment, less poverty due, in large part, to the increased number of working age people per household. [25] A drop in the dependency ratio carries with it greater female participation in the workforce, for lower fertility means there are fewer children to care for, freeing women to enter the paid workforce. Lower fertility also means better overall lifetime health for women, resulting in more years spent in the paid workforce for adult females. The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman per year) fell in Latin America from 5.6 for the years from 1965 to1970, to 2.4 for the years 2005 to 2010. The resulting demographic bonus has provided a significant, but fleeting, economic asset. By 2025, as the current population ages, Latin America will need to support a very large elderly dependent population. [26] It is fair to conclude that the reduction of poverty in Latin America in recent years was produced mainly by some short-term victories in the commodity lottery (as explained in Part I, the commodity lottery refers to short-term price rises for selected raw material exports), as well as a spike in remittances, and most of all, a one-time reduction in the dependency ratio. Income inequality data for Latin America is less positive. In the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased significantly in Latin America. For example, from 1984 to 1994, the income of the top 10 percent of the Mexico’s population rose by 21 percent, while the income of the country’s bottom 10 percent fell by 23 percent. Nevertheless, there have been improvements, albeit modest ones, in lowering the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality with 0 being the least inequality—everyone has the same income, and 1.0 being the most inequality—one person has all the income). Source: norlarnet.uio.no From 2002 to 2008, the Gini coefficient improved in seven Latin American states; five of these seven countries—Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—have traveled the farthest in rejecting neoliberalism. Outside of these nations inequality stayed the same or even increased, including in the largely neoliberal states of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Latin Americans earned 363 times more than the poorest 1 percent. By 1995, it was 417 times more. Latin America continues to show, by far, the greatest income inequality of any region in the world. Of the 15 most unequal economies in the world today, 10 are in the area. If Latin America’s income were only as unevenly distributed as that of Eastern Europe or South Asia, its recent economic growth, though sometimes anemic, would have reduced the percentage of those living in poverty to 3 percent of the population. [27] The Economist, in its 2010 review of the Latin American economic situation, concluded that the region was “well on the way to building middle-class societies.” [28] The evidence, however, contradicts this assertion. The informal sector—where people arrange irregular employment in itinerant retail sales, as day workers, or other loosely arranged jobs—today accounts for more than half of all workers in Latin America. More than eight of ten new jobs in Latin America are in the informal sector. [29] Informal sector workers enjoy no protective regulation or benefits. They live by their wits, striving to scratch out a living, day by day. Meanwhile, union membership among active workers in Latin America fell from around one-fourth in the 1980s to under one-sixth in the 1990s. Source: laht.com Moreover, significant areas of severe poverty remain in Latin America, expressed along class, racial, gender, and regional divides Poverty underlies poor health, contributing to elevated rates of infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. Of those living in poverty in Latin America, nearly half are children. Due to their undernourishment, a quarter of Latin American children (and as many as half in rural Perú and Guatemala) are stunted in their development. Across Latin America malnutrition is an underlying cause in more than half of the deaths of children under the age of five. In Guatemala maternal mortality among indigenous women is 83 percent higher than the national average. Among the poorest fifth of the Perú’s population, 85 percent of births are not attended by trained personnel, compared to only 4 percent among the wealthiest fifth. Two-thirds of Latin American municipalities do not treat their sewage prior to dumping it into adjacent rivers or the sea. In Panamá, three in ten homes lack access to improved sanitation (sewage disposal), and in Perú, nearly four in ten lack this essential service. Yet with all this effluvium flowing out, still three-quarters of Latin America municipalities do not check public drinking water supplies for impurities. One-quarter of Latin Americans do not have in-home potable water. [30] In Latin America nearly two-thirds of hospital admissions are due to diseases related to the lack of sanitation. Diarrhea accounts for six of every ten deaths of children under the age of five in Latin America. Fresh water can save lives; for each percentage point increase in potable water coverage, the infant mortality rate drops 1 death per 1,000 live births. Yet, Latin America is falling behind in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy in Latin America was five years longer than East Asia in the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1990s, it was 1.2 years shorter. [31] The weight of this evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it most succinctly, “Over the last three decades, economists…provid[ed]…theoretical justifications for financial deregulation and the unrestrained pursuit of short-term profits…[T]hey advanced theories that justified the policies that have led to slower growth…[and] higher inequality…[**E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant. Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been positively harmful for most people**.” [32] The Twilight of Neoliberalism “There is no alternative [to free market policies],” the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once pronounced, but across Latin America, there has been a steady erosion of support for the free market model. At present three-quarters of Latin America governments can be fairly characterized as being governed by center-left or left-oriented leaders. Moreover, there has been a far-reaching reassessment of the relevance of IMF advice, especially after the organization’s punishingly controversial response to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The Asian economic meltdown brought the reflexive recommendations from the IMF in the form of harsh austerity measures. However, the pro-cyclical policies demanded by the IMF of its client states so plainly worsened the economic situation and needlessly caused considerable human misery

### Off

**[Presumption – no evidence]**

### Case

**Against the affirmative’s paralyzing discursive politics, it is more important than ever to emphasize Marx’s insight that transformations in consciousness can never lead to social transformations—only struggling to transform the real material conditions that structure social relations can bring about social change**

**Marx, 1845**

(Karl, The German Ideology, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm>)

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the **material production** of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e. civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc. etc. and trace their origins and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). It has not, like the idealistic view of history, in every period to look for a category, but remains constantly on the real ground of history; **it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice;** and accordingly it comes to the conclusion that **all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism**, by resolution into “self-consciousness” or transformation into “apparitions,” “spectres,” “fancies,” etc. but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory. It shows that history does not end by being resolved into “self-consciousness as spirit of the spirit,” but that in it at each stage there is found a material result: a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation of individuals to nature and to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and conditions, which, on the one hand, is indeed modified by the new generation, but also on the other prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.

The aff reveals the perspective of the oppressed, and in so doing shares their secrets—this undermines the potential for resistance, turning the case

**Hundleby 5** (Catherine, U of Windsor, The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets, Hypatia, 20(4), Fall 2005, p. 44-58)//LA

I keep secrets. Even though I am told over and over by white feminists that we must reveal ourselves, open ourselves, I keep secrets. Disclosing our secrets threatens our survival. —María Lugones Postcolonial and other oppositional literature introduces many readers to secrets from the social margins, sometimes only mentioning them, sometimes sharing their content. Moving beyond colonialism and other forms of oppression is as much a goal as a description of this writing. Because survival may be threatened, the question arises in what circumstances feminists should expect the secrets of oppressed people to be shared, and so in what circumstances we should investigate or reveal them. This issue seems to confound the central claim of standpoint epistemologists—postcolonial, feminist, or otherwise—that there is cognitive value in learning from people’s experiences of oppression (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1986; Mills 1998). Whether or not one shares similar experiences, standpoint theorists argue, to begin thought from the perspective of “others” and “other ‘others,’” as Sandra Harding puts it, provides an epistemic advantage. Secrets concerned with resistance, such as in the Underground Railroad, women’s shelters, and lesbian passing, must be especially valuable and relevant to developing knowledge from a standpoint, because activism is supposed to be necessary to acquire the advantage. Yet, revealing aspects of resistance so vulnerable that they are kept secret threatens to undermine the potential of those secrets for resisting and opposing oppression. Thus, the epistemological value of oppositional secrecy seems to conflict with standpoint theorists’ advice of emancipatory activism. The case of oppositional secrecy seems to indicate an exception to standpoint theory, a case in which emancipatory politics does not encourage but prohibits sharing understanding. However, as I argue in this essay, the need to preserve oppositional secrecy is not an exception to, but only a limited case of, standpoint epistemology. Political considerations do not bar some of the understandings that might be gained, but political distinctions do indicate when and where the cognitive value of such understandings tapers off. The cognitive signifi- cance of exposing hidden understanding reduces in cases of extreme political vulnerability that morally require secrecy.

## 2NC

### AT: Perm

**They cannot stray from their 1ac performance – the choice to exclude certain discussions is not value neutral but a consequence of narrative framing – the 1ac is a static artifact and their attempt to escape that initial framing is in itself a form of violence**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne Kappeler, Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, 1995, pg. 69-71)

**The choice of formulation is political; it is an expression of one’s political attitude. Not only does it reveal how the subject con­stitutes itself — whom it chooses to address and to constitute as the ‘we’ of its discourse, and whom and what it chooses to make an object of speech. It also shows what the subject considers to be the ‘whole’ of the speech or action context and what it chooses to exclude from it**. That is, it reveals the subject’s communicative intention. If we lock others into the status of ‘the others’, for example, it is a sign that we do not wish to enter into communication and dialogue with them. Allocating ‘them’ the status of the ‘other’, ‘we’ are speak­ing to ‘ourselves’. As androcentric discourse is speech from men to men and about women, and Eurocentric discourse is speech among Europeans at the ‘centre’ of the world and about those at the ‘pen­phery’, so a white—women—centric discourse is a white women s soliloquy, power speaking to itself. Its addressees are ‘white women —not other white women addressed as communicants in a dialogue, but ‘white women’ as the plural of the white woman subject — we as the plural of myself, talking about ‘them’. It also means that, while we acutely object to being objectified through men’s sexist discourse, considering it to be a form of violence, we do not apparently consider it an act of violence if we ourselves objectify other women — all the less so if those women are absent from the specific speech context. **That is to say, we do not consider those we objectify and speak about to be a relevant part of the speech and action context, nor do we consider our act of objectifying them to have any consequences**

**MARKED**

**for them worth thinking about**. A ‘kind’ interpretation of this discursive behaviour would see it as a result of patriarchal socialization — acquired from dominant discourse as we acquired our ‘mother tongue’ from the speech of our mothers, so that we have unconsciously internalized racism, sexism, classism and scientificness, which now trap and implicate us in our own speech. It is an explanation which, just as Alice Walker criticizes, starts from the assumption of women’s weakness and damagedness, appeal­ing for indulgence on account of diminished responsibility. It is an explanation which also has its respectable model in the ‘high’ theory of semiology, which as Deborah Cameron points out ‘sees experience and indeed the individual herself, as a product and function of an institutionalised system of signs’, where language ‘defines our possi­bilities and limitations, [and] constitutes our subjectivities’.’ As an explanation of limitations and their causes, it is closer to excusing incapability and inadequacy than to positing them as a problem to be overcome. As feminists or Walker’s womanists, however, we will start from the assumption of women’s traditional competence and ability and attribute responsibility to ourselves. **For our aim is less to describe these symptoms in the interest of a precise diagnosis and aetiology of our speech impediments, than to analyse the power of discourse and the abuse of this power, in the interest of overcoming them**. **Nothing prevents us from questioning language use, least of all our own, from asking who we are speaking to when we say ‘we’, who is meant and who is not, and whether what we say applies to this group; when we say ‘women’, from asking ‘all women, or which women**?’, and when we describe facts, whether they are as we say, and if we are in a position to judge them. Nothing stops us asking about the acting subjects which have disappeared from passive and adjectival construc­tions representing actions, or from statements concerning perceptions, by whom ‘excluded’, by whom ‘oppressed’, to whom ‘invisible’, and so forth. That is, nothing stops us from attempting to render concrete again what has linguistically been abstracted. **For here we can take a first step towards changing political reality, analysing the contexts of action and naming the agents**. Only when we recognize the connec­tions and know those responsible for action can we begin to intervene in political reality and to know where to put up resistance. All the more so if the actions concerned are our own which we have thus tried to withdraw from (our) view. If we nevertheless fail to do so, if we continue to treat communic­ative and discursive behaviour as if they were a natural and individual attribute of ourselves like, say, the colour of our hair, it must be political intention. **If we are unwilling to question our use of language and to analyse the power relations in our linguistic behaviour, it betrays our willingness to use the relative power of educational and academic privilege and to abuse it in our own interest. To the extent that our language conforms to the structures of dominant discourse —in particular, its abstraction which conceals the substantial connections and relations of reality — it betrays an intention conforming to the meaning and function of that discourse: to legitimate and maintain power and the distribution of power in society.**

## 1NR

Marx’s insight has been all but discarded by the new left, with its emphasis on being postmodern, postcolonial, poststructural, postMarxist, or post-anything. This post-al politics of the contemporary left focuses on discourse and language at the expense of analyzing real material conditions. This post-al logic is complicit with capitalism, especially insofar as it obscures the operation of political economy and the material reality of capitalism

**Zavarzadeh, 94** – Department of English at Syracuse

(Mas’ud, “The Stupidity that Consumption is Just as Productive as Production”, The Alternative

Orange, V 4, Fall/Winter, http://www.etext.org/Politics/AlternativeOrange/4/v4n1\_cpp.html)

The task of this text[1] is to lay bare the structure of assumptions and its relation to the workings of the regime of capital and wage-labor (what I have articulated as “post-al logic"),[2] that unites all these seemingly different texts as they recirculate some of the most reactionary practices that are now masquerading as “progressive” in the postmodern academy. Analyzing the post-al logic of the left is important because it not only **reveals how the ludic left is complicit with capitalism** but, for the more immediate purposes of this text-of-response, it allows us to relate the local discussions in these texts to global problems and to deal, in OR‐2's words, with the “encompassing philosophical issues”[3] that are so violently suppressed by the diversionist uses of “detailism”[4] in these nine texts. Whether they regard themselves to be “new new left," “feminist," “neo-Marxist," or “anarchist," these texts—in slightly different local idioms—do the ideological work of US capitalism by producing theories, pedagogies, arguments, ironies, anecdotes, turns of phrases and jokes that **obscure the laws of motion of capital.** Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of “production” as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on “consumption” and “distribution” as the driving force of the social. The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that “labor," in advanced industrial “democracies," is superseded by “information," and consequently “knowledge” (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the “metaphysics of labor” and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the “outdatedness” of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy—which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler and others have advised)—should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) “mall"—the ultimate site of consumption “with all the latest high-tech textwares” deployed to pleasure the “body." In fact, the post-al left has “invented” a whole new interdiscipline called “cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from “production” to “consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its “progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, [Henry /Robert] Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how “consumption” is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from “production” to “consumption” manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on “superstructural” cultural analysis and **the preoccupation not with the “political economy**” ("base") **but with “representation**"—for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality and identity. This is, for example, one reason for R-2's ridiculing the “base” and “superstructure” analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of “argument” for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that “basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for him/her is to be thrown into an “epistemological gulag”. For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as R-4 puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the “surplus value” is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which “surplus value"—the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor—is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished, rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy, in these texts, therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to “politicizing the classroom” in OR‐1) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned into—through the process that OR‐3 calls “translation"—into “consumable” EXPERIENCES. The more “intense” the experience, as the anecdotes of OR‐3 show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic obscures the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves—many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my “Post-ality” in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that “democracy” is a never-ending, open "dialogue” and “conversation” among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is “power”; that a post-class hegemonic “coalition," as OR‐5 calls it—and not class struggle—is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-2 writes) is an “epistemological gulag"—a construct of power—and thus any form of “ideology critique” that raises questions of “falsehood” and “truth” ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the “other” truths by, in OR‐5 words, “staking sole legitimate claim” to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of “epistemology” is displaced in the ludic academy by “rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the “truth” of a practice but whether it “works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, R-4 is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the “truth” of my texts) end up “cutting our funding?" he/she asks. A post-al leftist like R-4, in short, “resists” the state only in so far as the state does not cut his/her “funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like OR‐5 to conclude that my argument “has little prospect of effectual force” in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of “epistemology” and the erasure of the question of “truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the “truth question” is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism (R-2), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the “difference” of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as R-2 sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of “epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables R-4 to answer my question, “What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is “wrong” with dogmatism, she/he says is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of his/her text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.[5]

The only hope is a politics which engages in struggles to change material social relations rather than discursive attempts to change assumptions – any attempt to work within the system of capitalism is doomed to failure – turns the aff

**Harman, 97** – editor of the Socialist Worker (Chris, Economics of the madhouse, Pg 99-100)

‘A reprise in the early 21st century of the conditions in the early part of this century. Such is the danger that confronts the world if we cannot deal with the present crisis concludes Will Hutton in his book The State We’re In. Those conditions included two world wars, the rise of Nazism, the collapse o democracy across most of Europe, the victory of Stalinism, the death camps and the gulag. If they were to be repeated in a few years time there is no doubt it would be on a much more horrific scale that even Hitler could not imagine. We would indeed be facing a future of barbarism, if not the destruction of the whole of humanity. Warnings of such a future are not to be treated lightly. Already the crisis of the 1990’s has begun to unleash the same barbaric forces we saw in the 1930’s. In one country after another political adventurers who support the existing system are making careers for themselves by trying to scapegoat ethnic or religious minorities. In the Russia, the Hitler admirer, racist, and proponent of nuclear war, Zhirinovsky got 24 percent of the vote in the November 1993 poll. In Bombay, another Hitler admirer, Bal Thackercey, runs the state government, threatening to wage war against the Muslim minority. In turkey the government and the military wage a war against the Kurdish fifth of the population, while the fascists try to incite Sunni Muslims to murder Alawi Muslims. In Rwanda the former dictator unleashed a horrific slaughter of Tutsis by Hutus, while in neighboring Burundi there is the threat of slaughter of Hutus by Tutsis. All this horror has its origins in the failure of market capitalism to provide even minimally satisfactory lives for the mass of people. Instead is leaves a fifth of the worlds’ population under nourished and most of the rest doubting whether they will be able to enjoy tomorrow the small comforts that allowed to them today Both the out and out defenders of ruling class power and today’s timid cowed reformists tell us there is no alternative to this system. But if that is true then there is no hope for humanity. Politics becomes merely about having the deckchairs on the titanic while making sure no one disturbs the rich and privileged as they dine at the captain’s table. But there is an alternative. The whole crazy system of alienated labor is a product of what we do. Human beings have the power to seize control of the ways of creating wealth and to subordinate them to our decisions, to our values. We do not have to leave them to the blind caprice of the market to the mad rush of the rival owners of wealth in their race to keep ahead of each other. The new technologies that are available today, far from making out lives worse have the potential to make this control easier. Automated work processes could provide us with more leisure, with more time for creativity and more change to deliberate where the world is going. Computerism could provide us with the unparalleled information about the recourses available to satisfy our needs and how to deploy them effectivly But this alternative cannot come from working within the system, from accepting the insane logic of the market, of competitive accumulation, of working harder in order to force someone else to worker harder or lose their job. The alternative can only come from fighting against the system and the disastrous effect its logic has on the lives of the mass of people.

Secrets are a prerequisite to liberation—revealing them endangers the lives and freedoms of the oppressed

**Hundleby 5** (Catherine, U of Windsor, The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets, Hypatia, 20(4), Fall 2005, p. 44-58)

Given the two distinguishable forms of oppositional secrecy, the question remains what political reasons generally keep people who oppose oppression from revealing or investigating the secrets of the oppressed despite the potential understanding to be gained. How does a person guided by standpoint theory decide when an oppositional secret may be revealed? How does an intellectual activist against oppression, who may or may not share a particular experience of oppression, know when to resist revealing or investigating politically justified secrecy? Whether one shares the particular experience of oppression, or shares the secret itself, the most obvious reasons for respecting the secrets of the oppressed rely on moral and political considerations. The political project of emancipation depends on keeping the secret, at least to some extent or in some way, and so an inquirer must be aware that violating that secrecy jeopardizes those who participate in it. The cost may be even their lives. Clearly, no foreseeable substantial moral or political threat to the participants in a secret can result from a permissible revelation. How is the threat to the oppositional project recognized and evaluated? People tend to resolve such dilemmas by seeking out those who share in the form of oppression, and those who are already trusted in sharing the secret. In the wrong hands, secrets are dangerous, can be misused, and indeed can reinforce the circumstances of oppression, however noble one’s intentions. The type of ignorance encouraged by social privilege may make a knower unaware of the dangerous implications of a particular piece of knowledge for the welfare of marginalized people. Consider how white or straight folks may be oblivious as they “out” and thus endanger a person who is passing. To ward off potential danger, one appeals to the immorality of disrespecting the secrets of others. The decision of when and how to reveal a secret is left as much as possible to the judgment of those whose secret it is.4 The more removed one is from the content being hidden—whether or not the circumstance involves oppression, but with special care if it does—the less political authority one has to evaluate that circumstance and to investigate or share the secret.5 So, one avoids revealing or inquiring into the sexual or racial identity of others. The person or people in question judge best the full practical and political import of open identificati